41 lines
2 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
2 KiB
Markdown
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## Errata (Design Decisions)
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### Reasoning Behind the Order of Preferred Random Data Sources
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The order is:
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1. `libsodium if available`
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2. `fread() /dev/urandom if available`
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3. `mcrypt_create_iv($bytes, MCRYPT_CREATE_IV)`
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4. `COM('CAPICOM.Utilities.1')->GetRandom()`
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5. `openssl_random_pseudo_bytes()`
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If libsodium is available, we get random data from it. This is the preferred
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method on all OSes, but libsodium is not very widely installed, so other
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fallbacks are available.
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Next, we read `/dev/urandom` (if it exists). This is the preferred file to read
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for random data for cryptographic purposes for BSD and Linux.
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Despite [strongly urging people not to use mcrypt in their projects](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/05/if-you-re-typing-word-mcrypt-into-your-code-you-re-doing-it-wrong),
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because libmcrypt is abandonware and the API puts too much responsibility on the
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implementor, we prioritize `mcrypt_create_iv()` with `MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM` above
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the remaining implementations.
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The reason is simple: `mcrypt_create_iv()` is part of PHP's `ext/mcrypt` code,
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and is not part `libmcrypt`. It actually does the right thing:
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* On Unix-based operating systems, it reads from `/dev/urandom`, which is the
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sane and correct thing to do.
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* On Windows, it reads from `CryptGenRandom`, which is an exclusively Windows
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way to get random bytes.
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If we're on Windows and don't have access to `mcrypt`, we use `CAPICOM.Utilities.1`.
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Finally, we use `openssl_random_pseudo_bytes()` **as a last resort**, due to
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[PHP bug #70014](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=70014). Internally, this
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function calls `RAND_pseudo_bytes()`, which has been [deprecated](https://github.com/paragonie/random_compat/issues/5)
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by the OpenSSL team. Furthermore, [it might silently return weak random data](https://github.com/paragonie/random_compat/issues/6#issuecomment-119564973)
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if it is called before OpenSSL's **userspace** CSPRNG is seeded. Also,
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[you want the OS CSPRNG, not a userspace CSPRNG](http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/02/25/safely-generate-random-numbers/).
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